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I. INTRODUCTION
Cases in which United States courts determine and apply the customary
international law of human rights have arisen with increasing frequency since
World War II, especially in more recent years.' Although customary
international law is used by United States courts in the same manner as any
other law, its content and applicability are often proved by expert testimony
rather than by means of citation and argumentation by counsel. This is so
because of a perceived "special nature" of international law. Traditionally,
it addresses the relationships between "independent sovereign states." Its
norms are the product of a consensual and decentralized legal system.2
Unfortunately, most judges in the United States (and, one suspects, in
many other legal systems as well) have, at the most, a superficial familiarity
with the theory of law creation in the international legal system and only the
vaguest notion of how the system functions. Furthermore, many judges
share the view of the lay public-and of many lawyers-that no true "law"
can exist absent some sort of central enforcement authority.3 This problem
is exacerbated with respect to international human rights law.4
Even with respect to those judges that have a general grounding in
traditional public international legal theory, the international law of human
rights may not appear to fit that traditional model.5 Superficially, interna-
tional human rights law is different because it addresses the relationships
between sovereign states and individual human beings, including a state's
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1 See, e.g., Foreign Human-Rights Disputes Increasingly Land in U.S. Courts, WALL ST.
J., Oct. 16, 1992, at B8.
2 BARRY E. CARTER & PHILLIP R. TRIMBLE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 14-15 (1991).
3 ANTHONY D'AMATo, INTERNATIONAL LAw: PRoCESs AND PRoSPECT 1 (1987).
4 Id. at 89.
' See Richard B. Bilder, An Overview of International Human Rights Law, in GUIDE TO
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGTs PRACTICES 31 (Hurst Hannum ed., 2d ed. 1992).
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own citizens, not the relationships among sovereign states inter ses.6
Consequently, cases involving the international law of human rights may
require more detailed explanations of that law's jurisprudential underpinnings
to U.S. decision makers than do those cases involving more traditional public
international law.7 This article addresses the relationship between the
special attributes of customary international law and the manner in which its
norms are introduced by expert testimony into the decision making processes
of United States courts with special emphasis on cases involving the
customary international law of human rights.
II. PROVING CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW
A. International Law in United States Law
The Supreme Court's statement in The Paquette Habanas that "interna-
tional law is part of our [the United States'] law"9 is generally accepted law
in United States courts, at least to the extent that it means that those courts
are free to find and "apply"10 the norms of customary international law in
appropriate domestic cases. The Court made it clear that international legal
norms and theory are part of the process of authoritative decision in the
United States," as long as those norms do not conflict with domestic law
6 The doctrine of state responsibility for injury to aliens was, of course, an important
element in "traditional" international law. See CARTER & TRIMBLE, supra note 2, at 11.
Those rules did not recognize, however, that individuals had international legal rights against
their state of nationality. Bilder, supra note 5, at 4-5.
7 See Joan Hartman, Enforcement of International Human Rights Law in State and
Federal Courts, 7 WHrrTIER L. REV. 741, 748-51 (1985). But see generally John Dugard,
The Application of Customary International Law Affecting Human Rights by National
Tribunals, 76 PROc. AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. 245 (1982), suggesting that customary international
human rights law enters common law courts as an aid to interpreting domestic statutes or
existing treaty obligations.
8 175 U.S. 677 (1900).
I d. at 700. See Respublica v. De Longchamps, 1 U.S. (1 DalI.) 111, 116 (1784).
10 For a discussion of the misleading effect of the phrase "applying the law" and its
variations, see Harold G. Maier, Baseball and Chicken Salad: A Realistic Look at Choice of
Law, 44 VAND. L. REV. 827 (1991) (reviewing LEA BRLmmAYER, CONFLiCT OF LAws,
FOUNDATIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS (1991)).
" Myres S. McDougal, The Impact of International Law upon National Law: A Policy-
Oriented Perspective, 4 S. DAK. L. REv. 25, 71 (1959).
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in the form of a controlling executive or legislative act or an existing
treaty. 12 The final authority on the content and interpretation of customary
international law as part of the law of the United States is the United States
Supreme Court. 3 Controversy continues about the precise meaning of this
principle of incorporation in the context of the United States governmental
structure and its constitutionally created judicial and administrative decision
making authorities. 4
The question whether international law is "directly applicable" within the
United States or must first be "incorporated" into United States law by some
official act, the hoary monist-dualist controversy, is, in reality, a controversy
over form, not substance. 5 It is primarily a dispute about styles of
2 175 U.S. at 700. An early draft of the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAw OF THE UNITED STATES took the position that changes in customary
international law would supersede existing contradictory domestic legislation passed prior to
the time that the change occurred. RESTATEMENT (REVISED) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS
LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, Tent. Dr. No. 1, § 135 (1980). That proposed section was
withdrawn because of insufficient support from the ALI membership. See transcript of
testimony by Professor Louis Henldn in Fernandez-Roque v. Smith, 622 F. Supp. 87 (N.D.
Ga. 1985), quoted in Harold G. Maier, The Authoritative Sources of Customary International
Law in the United States, 10 MICH. J. INT'L L. 450, 479 (1989).
" RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES,
§ 112(2) (1986) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT (THIRD)]. Matters necessarily relating to the
exercise of the federal foreign affairs power, e.g., interpreting United States international legal
obligations, are treated as matters of federal law. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376
U.S. 398, 423-27 (1963); see Harold G. Maier, The Bases and Range of Federal Common
Law in Private International Matters, 5 VAND. J. TRANS. L. 133, 163-73 (1971); Philip C.
Jessup, The Doctrine of Erie Railroad v. Tompkins Applied to International Law, 33 AM. J.
INT'L L. 740 (1939).
14 A discussion of the philosophical and theoretical aspects of the status of customary
international law in the United States law is beyond the scope of this article. For a clear
explanation and description of these issues, see Edwin D. Dickinson, Changing Concepts and
the Doctrine of Incorporation, 26 AM. J. INT'L L. 239 (1932). For an excellent summary
critique of various theories as well as the best historical analysis of the intent of the framers
of the United States Constitution with respect to this issue, see Stewart Jay, The Status of the
Law of Nations in Early American Law, 42 VAND. L. REV. 819, 848 (1989). For the
proposition that customary international law is directly authoritative in United States courts,
see generally Louis Henkin, International Law as Law in the United States, 82 MICH. L. REV.
1555 (1984). For this writer's views on that question and citation to views of other scholars,
pro and con, see generally, Maier, supra note 12.
"5 In The Paquette Habana, for example, the rules of customary international law had
been incorporated into the U.S. Navy's rules of engagement by order of the fleet admiral,
speaking for the President. See 175 U.S. at 712-13. The question whether the Court would
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argumentation-which books and holdings may be cited as "authority" and
which are only "persuasive" or about which branch of the United States
government shall decide "whether to constrain our own institutions."' 6 In
fact, the dispute has more relevance to theoretical academic discussion than
to predicting the results of actual authoritative decision making. United
States courts do, in fact, give effect to the norms of customary international
law in domestic adjudications" and, once they have done so, follow,
distinguish or ignore precedent on these issues just as they do in purely
domestic matters.
Arguments about whether international law becomes "part of" United
States law before or after such decisions are reached are somewhat vacuous
and clearly circular. When law is correctly recognized as a process of
authoritative decision, 8 the ultimate authority to determine the role and
impact of international law in domestic law in specific United States cases
lies with the national courts which decide them. 19 Judges in such cases
have the same limitations upon, and freedom to make, value choices, that
they have with respect to all other legal issues.20 Their decisions are
binding unless and until they are overturned on appeal. The only authority
that can overturn them is the highest United States court that reviews them
or, in some special instances, the appropriate domestic legislative authori-
ty.2 Therefore, more important for the lawyer than the theoretical debate
have applied the rules of customary international law to determine the validity of the capture
without such incorporation is not raised by the record in the case. The Executive Branch
chose to argue the content of international law before the Court and lost. Jordan J. Paust, 34
VA. J. INT'L L. 981, 988 (1994). Therefore, the Court necessarily did not consider whether
other components of executive power might have justified the seizure as a matter of domestic
law without regard to international legal norms.
16 Jay, supra note 14, at 848. See also Arthur M. Weisburd, The Executive Branch and
International Law, 41 VAND. L. REV. 1205 (1988).
17 See, e.g., Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
'0 LuNG-cHu CHEN, AN INTRODUCTION TO CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL LAw 11-16
(1989). See McDougal, supra note 11, at 71.
19 CHEN, supra note 18, at 12.
2o See Alfred P. Rubin, Enforcing the Rules of International Law, 34 HARv. INT'L LJ.
149, 150 (1993).
21 See, e.g., 22 U.S.C. § 2370(eX2) (1994) (The Second Hickenlooper Amendment),
overruling the result in Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964) and
incorporating by reference to the First Hickenlooper Amendment, 22 U.S.C. § 2370(eX1)
(1988), the United States Congress' definition of the international requirements for
compensation for expropriated property. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 13, § 444,
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is the question: what do United States courts actually do in cases in which
the rights of the parties may depend in whole or in part on the court's
decision to be guided by international legal norms in reaching a result?
B. Proving Customary International Law in United States Courts
Neither the Federal Rules of Evidence nor the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure make reference to methods or requirements for pleading or
proving customary international law in United States courts. Rule 44.1 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure recognizes the utility of expert
witnesses in proving foreign law but says nothing about international law.22
The Federal Rules of Evidence describe in some detail the role of opinions
and expert testimony with respect to domestic matters,23 but intentionally
omit any reference to proving foreign law on the grounds that that process
is more properly treated as being guided by rules of procedure.2' The
Federal Rules of Evidence, like the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, make
no reference to international law.
But the Federal Rules of Evidence permit proof of "legislative facts"
defined as "facts which have relevance ... in the formulation of a legal
principle ... by a judge or court."' Since the norms of customary
international law are inferred from the facts of community conduct, this
definition necessarily permits proof of such activities.26 Regardless of the
statutory base, United States courts regularly admit expert testimony about
the content and applicability of customary international law.27
nn.2, 3.
2 FED. R. Civ. P., § 44.1, provides in pertinent part: "he court, in determining foreign
law, may consider any relevant material or source, including testimony, whether or not
submitted by a party or admissible under the Federal Rules of Evidence. The court's
determination shall be treated as a ruling on a question of law." See 9 CHARLES A. WRIGHT
& ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRAcTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2444 (1994).
23 FED. R. EVID., §§ 701-704.
24 See Advisory Committee's Note on Judicial Notice of Law, Rule 201 (g), FED. R.
EvID., 56 F.R.D. 183, 207 (1973) [hereinafter Advisory Committee Note].
25 Id. at 202.
26 Hans Baade, Proving Foreign and International Law in Domestic Tribunals, 18 VA.
J. INT'L L. 619, 626 (1978).
27 RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 13, § 113. There appears to be no particular reason
why expert testimony should not also be used to prove the correct interpretation of treaties
to which the United States is a party. See Jonathan I. Charney, Judicial Deference in Foreign
Relations, 83 AM. J. INT'L L. 805, 808-10 (1989) (arguing that difficulties of accurately
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The United States Supreme Court's opinion in The Paquette Habana8
contains what is still the most authoritative general statement about the role
of expert witnesses in proving customary international law in United States
courts.29 With respect to that process of proof, the Court wrote:
... resort must be had to the customs and usages of
civilized nations; and, as evidence of these, to the works of
jurists and commentators, who by years of labor, research
and experience, have made themselves peculiarly well
acquainted with the subjects of which they treat. Such
works are resorted to by judicial tribunals, not for the
speculations of their authors concerning what the law ought
to be, but for trustworthy evidence of what the law really is.'3
discovering and applying customary international law are no greater than difficulties in
dealing with various branches of domestic law or with treaties). In fact, one author suggests
that courts may admit testimony of expert witnesses even on the content of purely domestic
law without fear of reversal. Baade, supra note 26, at 628. Nonetheless, expert testimony
may be more suspect in treaty interpretation cases than it is in cases dealing with customary
international law. See, e.g., the Solicitor General's statement that the "Court should neither
accept nor attach any weight to.. ." an affidavit by Professor Louis Hankin concerning the
meaning of the U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 3, 1951, 189
U.N.T.S. 150. Reply Brief for Petitioners at 232, Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council (No. 92-344).
Nonetheless, there seems to be considerable confusion about the utility of travaux
preparatoires as a guide to correct interpretation. For an excellent discussion of this and
other issues related to treaty interpretation, see David J. Bederman, Revivalist Canons and
Treaty Interpretation, 41 UCLA L. REv. 953 (1994).
The need to interpret treaties to which the United States is a party occurs primarily when
the treaty is self-executing and the court must apply it in the light of the intent of the states-
parties. Because the courts regularly give "great weight" to opinions of the Department of
State on the interpretation of treaties, the importance of private expert testimony may be
greatly diminished when the executive weighs in as a "super expert." RESTATEMENT (THIRD),
supra note 13, § 326(2). Consideration of "informative and reliable" testimony from
executive branch officials is consistent with the judicial process. Charney, supra, at 809.
2 175 U.S. 677 (1900).
2 See Catherine Tinker, Customary International Law in U.S. Courts, background paper
appended to THE REPORT BY A COMMITrEE OF TmE AMERICAN BRANCH OF THE INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW AssOcIATION TO THE ILA's COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL LAw IN
MUNICIPAL CouRTS 12-13 (1993) [hereinafter REPORT ON LAW IN MUNICIPAL COURTS].
" 175 U.S. at 700 (emphasis added). The Court, of course, refers here to the written
works of scholars, but there is no reason to assume that it would take any different position
with respect to scholarly oral testimony. Furthermore, the statement contains its own internal
difficulties. One cannot know what the law "really is" (as distinguished from knowing what
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Thus, for purposes of United States domestic law, scholarly opinions are not
themselves authoritative sources of customary international law but provide
indirect evidence of the existence and content of international legal norms."
C. The Role of the Expert Witness
Most often, expert witnesses in United States trials are social, physical or
biological scientists presenting forensic evidence to the judge or jury. The
very nature of customary international law suggests that the determination
of its norms and their application in specific cases most closely resembles an
exercise in social scientific empiricism.32 The international legal system
has no central decision maker to provide an authoritative articulation of the
policies that inform the system's rules. Rather, a multiplicity of scholars,
courts and statesmen articulate the norms of customary international law in
opinions derived in large part from historic records of national practice.
Competing theories about the jurisprudential nature of public international
law-indeed, disputes over its very existence-find their principal expression
its verbal descriptions are) with respect to a particular case until some decision maker
identifies the appropriate case-specific policies reflected in the rules and uses them as guides
to achieve a legal result in the case at bar. Until then, with respect to that case, there is no
"law"; there are only arguments about what the law (the result) ought to be. See Maier, supra
note 10, at 842. Cf. Henkin, supra note 14, at 1561-62, stating a kind of metaphysical view
that law can "exist" in some functionally meaningful sense apart from its use to guide and
explain a decision in a specific case.
31 In this respect, the U.S. Supreme Court's view of the role of publicists roughly parallels
the provision of Article 38(1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice. That article
designates judicial opinions and writings of highly qualified publicists as secondary sources
of international law. These writings make accessible a coherent history of acts and statements
by national decision makers from which inferences can be drawn that certain conducts and
customary practices are treated as legally prohibited or required by states in the world
community. Determining the existence and applicability of norms of customary international
law in United States courts is generally treated as a question of law, not as a question of fact.
In other words, the content of customary international law is determined by courts under
appropriate tests to determine the existence and validity of legal norms. Whether such norms
exist is not determined in accordance with the "weight of the evidence." See Tinker, supra
note 29, at 7.
32 Hartman, supra note 7, at 749. The accuracy of this statement does not depend upon
whether one treats international law as "natural" law, as "positive" law, or as describing a
process of authoritative decision. The record of historic practice remains relevant to
determine the expectations of world community members with respect to the norm in question
regardless of the theoretical basis assigned to give that norm the force of legality.
1995/96]
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in the writings of "expert" publicists.33
Access to the norms of traditional customary international law is supposed
to require that the facts of national practice and decision be discovered,
interpreted and described in much the same manner as a sociologist or
anthropologist collects and characterizes other facts of human activity. 4
This was especially true at the time of The Paquerte Habana when most
authoritative international legal rules were evidenced by the give and take of
on-going diplomatic exchange and bargaining, or by inferences derived from
national acts and their legal characterizations collected and described by
scholars.35
Those rules were not usually articulated by international arbitration or
adjudication or even by formal international agreement.' Public records
of those diplomatic exchanges, discussions and conclusions were difficult,
if not impossible, to find in an organized collected form. Therefore, most
authoritative statements synthesizing customary international legal rules were
found in the writings of publicists and, occasionally, in the opinions of
domestic courts.37 In fact, even the International Court of Justice virtually
ignores the facts of state practice in determining the content of international
law.38 Consequently, it is not surprising that United States courts are likely
to accept the conclusions of publicists without inquiring carefully into the
empirical data from which the expert witness draws his inferences about the
content and applicability of international law.
The role of expert witnesses in cases involving customary international
law is often anomalous. Because there is no universally acknowledged
" For an excellent short review and critique of these various theories, see McDougal,
supra note 11, at 27-32.
34 Finding the content and applicability even of domestic rules of law is necessarily
largely an empirical process. The language of the rule is abstract with respect to the case
before the court. Social facts relevant to determining the case's result include the intent of
the decision makers who promulgated the rule, the prior practice under it, the way in which
prior courts have interpreted it, and, sometimes, what has been said about it in the scholarly
literature. But, in ordinary domestic cases, that kind of "empirical" research is carried out
by the lawyers and the court, not by outside experts. Cf. Charney, supra note 27, at 810.
35 For a good illustration of the nature of this material, see 175 U.S. at 686-708.
36 International adjudication and arbitration did not begin until the early nineteenth
century. For an excellent short summary of the early history of international adjudication see
MARK W. JAN15, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 91-97 (1988).
3' See, e.g., 175 U.S. at 697-710.
38 See Jonathan I. Charney, Universal International Law, 87 AM. J. INT'L L. 529, 537
(1993).
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authoritative "text" for the rules of customary international law,39 a
domestic court is necessarily faced with the task of determining not only the
outcome of a case but also the relevant verbal formula that accurately
describes the policies accepted as law in the international community.
Expert witnesses on customary international legal matters, therefore, testify
at trial both about the verbal forms of rules and about how the rules' norms
operate under the facts of the case at bar.' °
The title "expert" suggests that such witnesses testify as "objective
observers" of the international legal scene. Given the often indeterminate
nature of customary international legal rules, experts usually act both as
advocates for particular conclusions about the content and applicability of the
international legal norms at issue and as reporters of the facts of international
community law making. Whether this dual role adversely effects the
expert's ability to aid the court is problematic. In any event, international
law experts do not differ, in this respect, from physical or social scientists
who may give conflicting expert opinions, based on their analysis of
identical empirically derived data. Also, they do not differ from experts on
foreign law who testify about how rules are applied in foreign courts or,
perhaps, about how a rule is regarded by a foreign population.
In all litigation, each party who engages an expert does so to obtain
testimony favorable to his or her side of the case.4 Those who use
international legal experts are no exception. Like expert witnesses in the
sciences whose relevant empirical research is often "case-specific,"
international legal experts normally testify about general legal norms inferred
from the history of the conduct of nation states and testify about how those
9 The increased frequency of international adjudication since World War H1 has begun
slowly to create a body of case law derived from decisions of international courts and
specialized tribunals interpreting various aspects of international law. Although many of these
cases are highly persuasive, there is no general legal requirement in United States law that
the decisions of such tribunals be treated as authoritative sources for the verbal forms of
customary international legal rules.
40 RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 13, § 113. See Tinker, supra note 29, at 13.
41 One appropriate approach for engaging an expert is for the lawyer to pose to the expert
a hypothetical problem, based on the facts of the lawyer's case. Drawing on his or her
existing expertise, the expert gives a tentative opinion. Based on that opinion, the lawyer
decides whether to ask the expert to testify in the case. In addition, prudent counsel, before
engaging the expert, will examine, or at least ask about, any material that the expert has
published with respect to the legal issue on which he or she will testify. Thus, counsel can
determine whether anything in that written record might appear to contradict the position that
the expert will assert in affidavit or testimony.
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norms apply under the specific facts of the case at bar. Despite their overt
association with one of the parties in the case, expert witnesses do testify
under oath that the opinions they give accurately represent their own
conclusions. Thus, regarding them as "objective reporters" with respect to
this element of their testimony is hardly inappropriate.
The participation of expert witnesses may be comforting to the judge in
an international case. Perceptive judges, at least in common law countries,
recognize that courts play a role as active policy makers in all legal
decisions, even when deciding "purely" statutory issues. 2 The perception
of public international law as a body of rules and principles generated by the
world community outside the authority of any single nation state necessarily
suggests caution on the part of the court when deciding public international
questions.43 Furthermore, matters touching foreign affairs are especially
sensitive to judicial intervention in the United States where constitutional
principles of separation of powers and centralized control of foreign affairs
matters signal that both state and federal judges need to exercise care to
avoid interfering with the national government or its political branches by
making conflicting or inappropriate policy judgments." Thus, even the
most sophisticated United States judges may find comfort in treating public
international rules as norms that are "found," not as a set of legal inferences
drawn from legal facts created outside the forum's system whose effect can
be modified or influenced by judicial decision. 45 Expert testimony about
the results of the law creation process in the international community
necessarily creates confidence for courts who may be venturing into
theretofore untrodden territory.
In the light of the reasons above, it is not surprising that courts find it
appropriate to receive information about the content and applicability of
international law from witnesses who testify as experts about that system's
42 See Morton J. Horwitz, The Emergence of an Instrumental Conception of American
Law, 1780-1820, in Law in American History, V PERSP. IN AM. HIST. 287, 316-19 (D.
Fleming & B. Bailyn eds., 1971).
4 See, e.g., Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 430-33 (1964).
"Id at 423-24, 431-33.
4S In this sense, the role of public international law is similar to the role of the Common
Law, as described by William Blackstone's COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND.
Blackstone treated the common law as a body of rules that courts "found," not as a process
of judicial decision making, characterized by the application of general principles to specific
fact situations to arrive at a judicially influenced legal result. See WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, I
COMMENTARIES ON THE LAws oF ENGLAND (Univ. of Chicago Press, 1979).
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norms and processes rather than by means of the ordinary research and
argumentation employed by adversary counsel when dealing with domestic
law.46 But despite this fact, as one scholar correctly points out,
... the resulting choice of values depends on their [the
courts'] perception of the system. No matter what the
rationale, the choice remains a human one. While the use
of a "rule of reason" or similar "objective" technique for
"discovering" the law that exists ostensibly outside of the
judge's discretion may disguise the realities, ultimately,
judicial decisions are part of a legislative process, and not
merely the administration of pre-existing, objectively real,
law.47
In other words, the judicial process in international law cases does not differ
from that same process in domestic cases.48
D. Criticisms of the Role of Expert Witnesses in International Law Cases
The international legal expert's multifaceted role as a witness to sociologi-
cal, historical, anthropological, jurisprudential, psychological and legal facts
in domestic international litigation has lead to a multiplicity of concerns,
criticisms and misunderstandings about that role. One of the early concerns
stated is a red herring and can be dismissed virtually out of hand. The
question was whether an expert witness who testified under oath necessarily
guaranteed the accuracy of his or her analysis and would be, therefore, guilty
of pejury if the testimony turned out to be "wrong" or if the court ruled
'6 The empirical process required to determine the content of international legal norms
is reflected in Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice. After expressly
identifying treaties and conventions, "customary practice accepted as law" and "general
principles of domestic law" as primary sources of international law, Article 38(1) explicitly
permits the use of "expert witnesses" in the form of judicial decisions and the writings of
publicists as "secondary sources" of international law. The role of these "experts," however,
is more closely analogous to the role of treatise writers and court opinions in civil law
jurisdictions than to the role of expert witnesses on international law before U.S. tribunals.
47 Rubin, supra note 20, at 150.
4See Maier, supra note 10, at 830-45.
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against the expert's position.4 9 It is clear, however, that the expert swears
solely to the proposition that his or her testimony is an honest opinion, not
that it is the only possible opinion or that reasonable persons cannot
reasonably disagree about the conclusions that the expert reaches.
A different and more relevant criticism is that, once involved in a case, the
expert witness perforce changes from an "objective" analyst of international
law to a partisan advocate of a particular point of view. There is, I think,
a good bit of truth to this claim, but the advocate's role is not harmful to the
expert's ultimate utility to the decision maker nor does it differ significantly
in this respect from the role of other types of expert witnesses. It is certainly
not detrimental when there are "experts" on different sides of an issue. In
those circumstances the advocacy roles played by the experts may tend to
sharpen the opinions and provide more, rather then less, assistance to the
court.
The expert witness can, if properly used, play an educational role that is
invaluable to both counsel and the court. This is especially true with respect
to cases that involve issues arising under customary international law. Most
lawyers and judges who have not had extensive experience with international
legal matters have only a vague idea of what international legal scholars do.
Most of the scholarship in this field is read solely by persons already
knowledgeable and interested (or by students), not by the general bench and
bar. Even those who work in the legal offices of foreign affairs ministries
are often too rushed or too busy to keep up with new developments or new
analytical approaches in the international field. Responses to the problems
on which they work are frequently needed on daily or hourly deadlines; there
is no such thing as a six month lead time to research and consider "the best"
solution. Thus, even for government officials specifically charged with the
task of dealing with international law, the presence of international legal
experts can play an important and useful educational role 50
" See exchange between Professors Hans Baade and Michael Cardozo, Panel Discussion,
Proving International Law in a National Forum, 70 PRoC. AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. 10, 13 (1976).
" One recognition of the utility of academic counsel was the United States Department
of State's practice of inviting, each year, one academic international lawyer to serve as
Counselor on International Law in the Office of the Legal Adviser. Not only did that practice
provide easy access to academic expertise for lawyers in the Legal Adviser's Office during
each Counselor's term, but it forged continuing informal relationships between personnel in
that office and a cadre of former Counselors that is of continuing utility.
The Counselor's position was created in the early 1970s as the result of consultations
between John R. Stevenson, then Legal Adviser to the Department of State, and Professor
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The presence of an expert witness in the courtroom to testify with respect
to the content and applicability of international law may lead a court to
expand the expert's role beyond that field to encompass subject matter that
is normally accessible to the court by judicial notice and argument of
counsel. This is precisely what happened in Fernandez Roque v. Smith,5
one of the Marielitos Cases, involving the rights of Cuban citizens who had
come to the United States as part of the "Freedom Flotilla" from Cuba's
Mariel Harbor in 1980. The principal issue that the expert witnesses
52
addressed was whether detention in federal prisons of some 1800 of the
125,000 Cubans who had entered the United States in the boat lift violated
either the United States Constitution or the customary international law of
human rights.
The Cubans involved in that case were classified as "excludable aliens,"
aliens who are physically present inside the United States but who had
arrived in United States territorial waters without proper immigration papers
or prior authorization from United States government officials.53 They were
permitted to land because the alternative was to leave them on the high seas
in their mostly unseaworthy boats. Most of the Mariel Cubans were released
on parole into the U.S. population on a finding that they were non-violent
Louis B. Sohn of Harvard Law School who served as the first Counselor. This writer had the
privilege of serving as Counselor in 1983-84. Unfortunately, the nature of the position seems
to have changed in recent years with its occupants being either existing personnel from the
Legal Adviser's Office or academicians who use the position principally as a base for
conducting their own research.
SI Fernandez-Roque v. Smith, 622 F. Supp. 887 (N.D. Ga. 1985).
52 The experts were Professor Louis Henkin of Columbia University Law School for the
plaintiffs and this writer for the defendant United States government.53 Their journey was encouraged in part by a statement from President Jimmy Carter that
the United States would "provide an open heart and open arms to refugees seeking freedom
from Communist domination .. " Garcia-Mir, 788 F.2d at 1448, quoting League of Women
Voter's Speech, 16 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 834-35 (May 5, 1980). As the price of their
freedom to depart, Cuban President Fidel Castro had required that the emigrants take with
them a group of some 400 mental defectives and violent criminals who were incarcerated in
Cuban prisons and other institutions. See Fernandez-Roque, 622 F. Supp. at 896. The
Eleventh Circuit held that Carter's statement did not amount to a carte blanche invitation to
enter the United States without complying with United States immigration law or other
established policies. Garcia-Mir, 788 F.2d at 1451-53.
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and likely to remain so.' The United States government incarcerated some
1800 of them in an Atlanta federal prison, some because they had criminal
records for violent crimes in Cuba, some because they had forfeited their
freedom by violating their parole conditions after release in the United States
and some because they had not yet been granted parole under a Status
Review Plan." Few of the Cubans had actually been convicted of crimes
under United States law.'
The American Civil Liberties Union together with the Atlanta Legal Aid
Office and the Columbia University Law School Immigration Clinic 7
brought a class action for habeas corpus to have the Cuban detainees
released on the theory that detaining them violated the United States
Constitution. The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals dismissed the case,
holding that the due process provisions of the United States Constitution did
not apply to the processes of admission or immigration for excludable aliens
because, for this purpose, such aliens are treated, as a matter of law, as if
they were still outside United States borders."
The ACLU reasoned that the detainees might have rights under customary
international law because, as excludable aliens, they were still constructively
in international waters. Consequently, the ACLU filed another suit, this time
arguing that the Cubans were being subjected to prolonged arbitrary
detention in violation of the customary international law of human rights. 9
That law, the ACLU argued, was part of the law of the United States and
I Such releases were accomplished under a Status Review Plan and Procedures, issued
by the United States Attorney General. In addition to being found non-violent, an applicant
had to demonstrate that he or she was unlikely to commit any criminal offense if released and
had to have a suitable domestic "sponsor." For a more complete discussion of the facts of
these cases, see Fernandez-Roque v. Smith, 567 F. Supp. 1115 (N.D. Ga. 1983), rev'd, 734
F.2d 576 (lth Cir. 1984).
ss See Fernandez-Roque, 567 F. Supp. at 1115, rev'd, 734 F.2d at 576. The administra-
tive machinery under the Status Review Plan moved very slowly. Paroles under the plan
were suspended altogether in early 1985 when the Castro government agreed to accept the
return of the incarcerated Cubans at the rate of slightly more than 100 per month. Shortly
after the repatriations began, the Cuban government refused to carry out the agreement in
retaliation for the anti-Castro broadcasts of a U.S. radio station (RADIO MARTI) that began
operations, with the blessings of the Reagan Administration, in early 1985.
6 See 567 F. Supp. at 1115.
The ACLU came into the case late but handled most of the litigation in connection with
the international human rights issues.
5 Fernandez-Roque, 734 F.2d at 576.
" See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 13, § 702(e).
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required the Cubans' release.'
The only evidence submitted at the trial was expert testimony that dealt
with the content and applicability of the international law of human rights
in United States courts. Both the U.S. government and the ACLU accepted
the proposition that there was a customary international law of human rights
and that it prohibited "arbitrary and prolonged detention." There were two
important issues before the federal court. One was whether the detention of
the 1800 Cubans in federal prison was "arbitrary and prolonged" within the
meaning of that customary rule; the second was what, if any, effect that rule
had on the internal law of the United States.
This second issue is a matter of United States constitutional law, not of
international law. Nonetheless, the two experts, with the encouragement of
the trial judge, spent considerable time giving opinions about the role of
customary international law in the law of the United States in addition to
testifying about the customary international law of human rights. Technical-
ly, the domestic law issue was not a proper subject for "expert" testimony,
even though both witnesses had scholarly credentials in the field, because it
dealt solely with the law of the United States of which the court can take
judicial notice. My own view is that the court, recognizing the importance
of the constitutional issue involved, welcomed the chance to hear from two
experts who had opposing views in the exercise of its right to inform itself.
In effect, the experts on international law became advocates for conflicting
views about United States constitutional law, almost as if they were attorneys
representing clients before the court.6"
E. The Experts' Special Role in Human Rights Cases
Cases involving the customary international law of human rights may
suggest a false dichotomy between that body of law and traditional public
international law. One pole of the dichotomy is the proposition that nations
are absolutely sovereign within their own territories and have freedom to do
anything they wish within those territorial borders as a result of that absolute
' Fernandez-Roque v. Smith, 622 F. Supp. 887 (N.D. Ga. 1985).
61 Approximately 40 pages of the 125 page trial transcript in Fernandez-Roque v. Smith,
622 F. Supp. 887 (N.D. Ga. 1985) were devoted to testimony interpreting United States case
law and statutes, more or less evenly divided between the two expert witnesses. See
Transcript of Testimony, Garcia v. Smith, No. C81938A (N.D. Ga. July 1, 1985). (Copy in
author's files.).
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sovereignty.62 This concept of sovereignty is tied directly to the jurispru-
dential principle that public international law is created by the consent of
nations.63 The "consent" metaphor conjures up the image of the nation
state as a living sentient entity that has, in principle, absolute independence
unless limited by community norms. Given such a view, the proposition that
human beings can have rights as individuals under international law, separate
and apart from domestic legal protections of national law, necessarily appears
to be an anomaly. These traditional principles and attitudes anthropomorph-
ize states, implying that each is a separate entity existing in its own right and
with legal authority independent of the acts of human beings.
But no one has ever seen a nation state. One can see its territory, its
population, even its government buildings, but the state itself is an abstrac-
tion that does not exist except in the minds of lawyers. To treat it as
something other than that is to obscure its role as a conduit for the
acquisition and exercise of human rights and duties.
The other pole of the dichotomy is the proposition that because the
customary international law of human rights purports to grant rights to
individuals against sovereign states, including a complainant's state of
nationality, recognizing the existence of a body of law conferring rights on
individuals is in conflict with the traditional view that the state is the only
legal person in international law. The perception of such a conflict arises
from a failure of decision makers to understand the role played by the
characterization "sovereign state" in modern public international law.
The concept "sovereignty" is a legal construct, used to describe a
particular nexus of human social interaction. It embodies, as Professor
Michael Reisman has put it, "a decision about decision making,"
recognizing "a structure of expectation concerning who, with what qualifica-
tions and mode of selection, is competent to make which decision by what
criteria and what procedures." 65
Thus, the label "sovereignty" characterizes a process, not a particular set
62 See, e.g., L. OPPENHEIM, I INTERNATIONAL LAW: A TREATISE §§ 168-71 (2d ed.
London, 1912).
' Thus, traditionally, only states can be parties before an international tribunal. See, e.g.,
ICJ Stat., Art. 34(1).
" W. Michael Reisman, Law from the Policy Perspective, in INTERNATIONAL LAW
ESSAYS: A SUPPLEMENT TO INTERNATIONAL LAW IN CONTEMPORARY PERSPEcivE 9 (1981)
[hereinafter INTERNATIONAL LAW ESSAYS].
'6 Myres S. McDougal & Harold D. Lasswell, The Identification and Appraisal of Diverse
Systems of Public Order, in INTERNATIONAL LAW ESSAYS, supra note 64, at 20.
220 [Vol 25:205
THE ROLE OF EXPERTS
of substantive rights. It is a process by means of which human beings
acquire rights and exercise duties as groups; but the rights thereby acquired
are nonetheless human rights.
From this perspective, all international law is international human rights
law. Rights of a nation are merely the rights a group of human beings.66
Only human beings make the relevant decisions and only human beings can
have expectations about the competence of the decision makers in the nation
state. 67 The nation state is merely a conduit through which human beings
act and communicate." It can have no role or authority separate from
humankind, either inside or outside its borders. Like a corporation or any
other legal construct, a sovereign state cannot act without the agency of
human beings; it is solely the decisions of human beings that the acts of
sovereign states reflect.' This was the lesson of Nuremberg.7°
In the same sense that the concept of due process transcends the
authorities conferred upon the governmental units in the United States, the
concept of a pervasive international law of human rights necessarily
transcends the legal constructs used to explain the social mechanisms
employed to conjoin and corroborate those common expectations concerning
authority that we understand by law.7'
III. CONCLUSION
Today, the expert witness's role when testifying about customary
international law need no longer be restricted to reporting evidence of the
6See Harold G. Maier, Ethics, Law, and Politics, 15 YALE J. INT'L L. 190, 194-95
(1990) (reviewing LEA BRILMAYER, JUSTIFYING INTERNATIONAL AcTs (1989)).
67 See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 198-99 (1961).
68 See generally Harold G. Maier, The Principles of Sovereignty, Sovereign Equality, and
National Self-Determination, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY 241,
242 (Paul B. Stephen III & Boris M. Climes eds. 1991).
6See Harold G. Maier, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction at a Crossroads: An Intersection
Between Public and Private International Law, 76 AM. J. INT'L L. 280 (1982).
70 International Military Tribunal (Nuremberg), Judgment and Sentences, in 41 AM. J.
INT'L L. 172, 221 (1947).
71 See Myres S. McDougal, The Hydrogen Bomb Tests and the International Law of the
Sea, 49 AM. J. INT'L L. 356, 358 n.7 (1955). For a description of the legacy of Nuremberg
to the work of the Commission of Experts to investigate violations of international
humanitarian law in the former Yugoslavia, see M. Cherif Bassiouni, The United Nations
Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to Security Council Resolution, 88 AM. J. INT'L
L. 784, 805 (1994).
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consent of nations. One important role an expert witness may play in human
rights cases is to make clear that there are universal norms of conduct that
result from legitimate human expectations and that these expectations of
pattern and uniformity are as important a source of international law as are
any formal or informal indicia of consent expressed through the institution
of the sovereign nation state. 2 Whether those expectations are treated as
having their formal source in a customary international law of human rights
or in the federal common law of the United States is immaterial. In either
event, customary international law principles will be applied by the court to
the facts of the cases at bar.73 The end result is the same. The results in
the individual cases are unlikely to differ with the authoritative source
selected. Thus, the court may avoid the difficult (and, likely unsolvable)
jurisprudential problems inherent in the monist-dualist controversy while, at
the same time, arriving at a result that "makes sense."'74 Whether the party
before the court has his or her human rights adequately protected from
incursion by government without removing, at the same time, adequate
protection for the rights of the forum state's citizenry is, (or, at least, ought
to be) the principal objective sought by both the state and the advocates.
Expert witnesses on customary international human rights law should be
careful not to attempt to prove too much. There is an understandable
tendency for all of us to wish to right the wrongs of the world in one fell
swoop. Unfortunately, neither do the wrongs provide a subject-matter nor
does the world provide an environment conducive to such sweeping
solutions.
One of the quickest ways to weaken international human rights law is to
claim too much for it. The "Oh-My-God-Isn't-It-Awful" style of legal
7 This approach may avoid "the temptation to adapt or reinterpret the concept of
customary law in such a way as to ensure that it provides the 'right' answers. .. ." Bruno
Simma & Philip Alston, The Sources of Human Rights Law: Custom, Jus Cogens and
General Principles, 12 AUSTL. Y.B. INT'L L. 82, 83 (1992).
" If customary international law is treated as being part of federal common law, expert
testimony might not be permitted or required; rather, the issue would be resolved by the
briefing and argument techniques normally employed by counsel with respect to domestic law
matters. Since the informing general principles that the court seeks to guide its common law
decision in such cases would derive from customary international law, however, it is highly
unlikely that the court would refuse the assistance of expert witnesses to determine the current
state of those principles whether such witnesses were presented by the parties or called on the
court's own motion.
74 See KARL LLEwELLYN, How APPELLATE CoURTS DECIDE CASEs 1-28 (1951).
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analysis is all too prevalent in some human rights literature, including some
of the case law. When that approach is used as a substitute for analysis, not
only the progress of the general cause but the likelihood of winning the
specific case is weakened. Worse, even, is the tendency to treat those who
disagree with the expert's conclusions as if they were, on that account, evil
minions of oppression." No such approach is likely to convince the
doubtful.
S ".. . [The attempt to impose any person or class or orthodoxy's view of morality on
society as a whole must, by definition, deny the full humanity of those who disagree, thereby
justifying atrocities in the name of reason and morality." See Rubin, supra note 20, at 153.
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